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Salaries, Salary Growth, and Promotions 
of Men and Women in a Large, Private Firm 
Barry A. Gerhart 
George T. Wilkovich 
Preprint t87-04 
Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies 
New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations 
Forthcoming in Pay Equity: Empirical Inquiries, Edited by Robert Michael 
& Heidi Hartmann, National Academy Press. 
This paper has not undergone formal review or approval of the faculty of 
the ILR School. It is intended to make the results of Center research, 
conferences, and projects available to others interested in human resource 
management in preliminary form to encourage discussion and suggestions. 
Salaries, promotions, and salary growth of men and women in a large, 
diversified firm were examined for the years 1980 through 1986. Consistent with 
other studies, men's average salary was higher than women's average salary. 
However, statistical adjustment for gender differences in-education, tenure, time 
at level, experience, and job level substantially reduced the salary advantage 
of men over women. 
Although the average salary of men was higher than that of women in 1980 and 
1986, women actually received greater numbers of promotions, as well as larger 
percentage salary increases between 1980 and 1986. One reason for women's salary 
growth advantage was the higher average performance ratings of women between 1980 
and 1986. One important reason for women's promotion advantage was their greater 
liklihood of being in (lower) job levels where promotion opportunities were 
greatest. 
As a result of the greater promotion and salary growth rate for women, the 
ratio of menlwomen salaries rose from .84 in 1980 to .88 in 1986, thus reducing 
the raw salary gap (1 - .84 = .16) by 25% ([.88 - -8411.16) in a six year period. 
Projection of salary growth patterns observed during the 1980-1986 period suggests 
that the pay of men and women would equalize in approximately 15 years. 
A key implication of the study is that the conclusion one draws regarding 
the promotion and compensation practices of firms with respect to men and women 
may differ depending on the methodology and type of data used. Thus, for example, 
examination of data at multiple points in time facilitates study of human resource 
processes. Study of these processes may yield different implications than sole 
reliance on a "snapshot" of human resource outcomes taken at a single point in 
time. 
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access to firms, occupations, and jobs. Fuchs (1971), in fact, contended that 
virtually the entire earnings gap between men and women could be eftplained if an 
occupational classification scheme having sufficient detail were used, but noted 
that the question of why men and women had different occupational distributions 
then needed to be resolved (see also Sanborn, 1964). Although it is clear that 
access to jobs and occupations is an important determinant of earnings, little 
research has examined the question of why such attainments differ according to 
gender. 
A second problem with market-wide studies of gender-based discrimination is 
that they provide no direct information on worker productivity at the level of 
the firm. As one consequence, previous research has had to rely on indirect 
measures of productivity (e.g. experience, tenure, and education). However, some 
evidence indicates that such measures may converge poorly with measures of 
productivity at the level of the firm (e.g. Medoff 6 Abraham, 1981; Brown, 1982). 
All firms attempt to assess the productivity of their workers in one way or 
another. Many firms formalize this process by, for example, regularly conducting 
performance appraisals of employees. In these firms, compensation and internal 
staffing (e.g. promotion) decisions are often explicitly based on such productivity 
measures . 3  These measures have a number of desirable characteristics. First, 
they are designed to assess worker productivity in a specific job in a specific 
firm. Second, such measures are influenced by human capital characteristics only 
insofar as the latter are useful in performing the particular job in question. 
In other words, firm-level productivity measures potentially carry information 
on the quality of the match between the worker's abilities and what the job 
requires. Third, these job-specific productivity measures reflect differences 
in worker motivation, which together with the ability-job requirements match, affect 
actual individual performance levels. 
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Given the discussion above, three avenues of labor market discrimination 
research would appear to be especially useful. First, firm-level'research is needed 
that examines differences in men and women's salaries adjusted for possible 
differences in job-specific productivity measures. Second, research on the 
determinants of occupational and job attainments would also be helpful. Some 
evidence indicates that substantial gender-based within-firm job segregation may 
exist (Bielby 5 Baron, 19861, suggesting that job level may be an important 
determinant of gender-based salary differences within firms. Although within-firm 
analyses have been rare in the literature, they have indeed found the effect of 
job level on earnings differences to be quite large, especially relative to 
within-job differences (Malkiel & Malkiel, 1973; Halaby, 1979; Rosenbaum, 1985). 
Third, longitudinal data would permit study of changes in salary. Further, such 
data would aid in assessing the extent to which firms' promotion practices 
contribute to job level differences. Again, it would also be useful to know what 
role job specific performance measures play in promotion and salary increase 
decisions. 
In the present research, we examine possibile gender differences in attainment 
in a large, private firm. Specifically, we focus on three general issues. First, 
controlling for job level, performance ratings, and individual characteristics, 
is there a salary disadvantage against women? Second, given longitudinal data, 
we can move beyond cross-sectional analyses and examine models of salary change 
in over time, addressing questions of the following type. Do women's salaries 
grow at the same rate as men's? Do men and women receive equal salary increases 
for a given level of performance? Do men and women receive equal salary returns 
from promotions within the firm? Unlike much previous research, moreover, we not 
only measure whether a promotion has occurred, but also the number of promotions 
over time. Third, controlling for initial job level, performance, and individual 
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characteristics, do men and women receive different numbers of promotions over 
time? In other words, are women, for example, held to higher promotion standards 
(Olson 6 Becker, 1983)? 
- 7 
The Firm 
The data are from the personnel information system of a firm that produces 
a highly diversified set of industrial and consumer products. It has roughly 100 
manufacturing operations in more than 30 states. The firm enjoyed general financial 
success during the period of the study, as evidenced by revenues that grew faster 
than the Consumer Price Index and a return on equity that comfortably exceeded 
the median for the Fortune 500. 
Exempt jobs are the focus of this study. Professional, managerial, sales, 
and technical jobs are the major broad categories. Examples of some of the most 
common job titles include engineer, senior engineer, sales representative, area 
sales manager, administrative assistant, technologist, supervisor, and maintenance 
supervisor. 
Compensation policies and practices of the firm are typical of those in the 
Fortune 500. For example, the firm participates in over 6 annual salary surveys 
for jobs included in the present study. The focus of these surveys varies. For 
instance, some focus on a selected group of perhaps 10-15 product market 
competitors. In contrast, others focus on labor market competitors that employ 
persons with similar skills or have similar occupations. Statistical methods are 
used to combine the results of surveys. However, considerable judgment is also 
exercised because of different degrees of confidence placed on the results of the 
various surveys. This is consistent with Rynes and Milkovich's (1986) argument 
that ad hoc judgments are typically made throughout the process. 
Strategy also plays an important role in determining pay level. During the 
time period of the study, a policy of "paying with the leaders" was followed for 
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the jobs we examined. In practice, this policy meant establishing the pay policy 
line at the 50th percentile of the group of pay leaders. 
The pay structure of the jobs included in this study was maintained with the 
. - 
help of a single national job evaluation system. The structure is defined by 15 
job classes or levels, each with minimum and maximum rates of pay roughly 20% below 
and above the midpoint. A survey of 557 major U.S. firms by the Conference Board 
(1984) found that the median number of levels in exempt pay structures for all 
industries was 19. The compensable factors used in the job evaluation point system 
are: education/knowledge required, experience required, complexity of duties, 
working conditions, and responsibility. Of the 491 firms using formal job 
evaluation in the Conference Board study, 90% used a formal plan. Of this group, 
approximately 202 used a point plan of the general type used by the firm we studied. 
An explicit pay-for-performance policy exists for the determination of 
individual pay increases. The policy is implemented through the use of annual 
merit increase guides (see Milkovich & Newman, 1987 for some examples). These 
guides are designed to control the cost of annual pay increases, as well as to 
encourage a distribution of increases to employees. According to the previously 
mentioned Conference Board survey, 83% of firms used such guides. In the firm 
we studied, recommended salary increase ranges were a function of (a) merit rating 
on one axis and (b) current position in the salary range on the other axis. Higher 
ratings and less penetration into the salary range at a particular level were 
associated with both larger and -more frequent salary increases.4 
Promotions are based on performance as well, with some additional consideration 
also given to years of experience accumulated with the firm. A salary increase 
comes with promotions. Again, the corporate compensation department issues yearly 
guidelines that specify the size of promotional increases. The importance of 
-examining the firm's promotion system is increased by the fact that the firm engages 
in a fairly strong practice of promotion from within. Thus, women's access to 
higher level jobs is most often governed by decisions made while they are current 
employees. Direct access from the external labor market is limited. 
. - 
. 
Performance is assessed through a formal, annual performance appraisal 
process.5 The immediate supervisor rates each employee on a &point scale with 
4 being the highest performance level. Raters receive instructions to consider 
not only how well job requirements were satisfied, but also the difficulty of the 
job requirements, as well as the appropriateness of methods used to satisfy the 
job requirements. The numerical rating is supplemented by a written description 
of the subordinates performance during the year. The complete appraisal is 
typically reviewed by a higher level manager. 
We note that the method of appraisal, as well as its central role in making 
promotion and salary increase decisions is consistent with the way firms typically 
operate with respect to their exempt employees. The review system is also a common 
feature of performance appraisal plans.6 
In equal employment opportunity (EEO), the firm's standard training for its 
managers included materials on EEO compliance with respect to staffing, access 
to training, compensation, and performance appraisal. The inclusion of EEO issues 
in training programs is typical of large firms. Corporate personnel monitored 
managers' actions in these areas and encouraged improvement In those displaying 
subpar performance. 
Several external events may have also had an effect on the firm's human 
resource practlces. First, as with many large firms, it faced equal employment 
opportunity litigation during the 1970s. The major case involved a class action 
suit filed by female hourly employees in a very small number of the approximately 
100 plants. This suit was eventually settled out of court for a substantial sum 
of money. As part of the settlement, the firm stated that it would also develop 
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a plan to enhance the hiring and promotion of female salaried employees. We wish 
to emphasize, however, that this litigation did not involve female salaried 
employees. Further, no formal or numerical goals for salaried women came about 
.- 
as 'a result of the litigation activity. 
A second external influence was the recession of the early 1980s. Again, 
as with many other large firms, the firm we studied reduced the siz; of its white- 
collar workforce during this period. Much of this reduction came about through 
early retirement. As a result, the number of men in exempt jobs actually declined 
slightly over the course of the study. In contrast, the number of women in exempt 
jobs grew by over 50% during the same period. 
METHOD 
Sample 
The present study includes two samples: exempt employees in job levels 1 
through 8 (a) present in 1986 (the cross-sectional sample) and (b) present in both 
1980 and 1986 (the longitudinal sample). The majority of exempt employees are 
employed in these levels (approximately 84% of men, 97% of  omen).^ The cross- 
sectional sample includes 2412 women and 9647 men. The longitudinal sample includes 
840 women and 5550 men. 
Measures 
The dependent variables are annual salary, salary growth, and promot ions .9 
The first set of independent variables, referred to as human capital (HC) variables 
in this study, are firm tenurelo, job tenure (years at a particular job level), 
potential experience (age - years of schooling - 6), and education dummies for 
highest degree. Squared terms for job tenure, firm tenure, and potential experience 
are also included. In the cross-sectional analyses, the most recent performance 
rating prior to the most recent salary change is used. In the longitudinal 
analyses, the average performance rating over the 1980-1986 time frame is used. 
The variables used in the present study are summarized in Appendix 1. 
Analyses 
The following salary equation is estimated separately for years 1980 and 1986: 
. - 
. 
Ln(Sit) = XitBt + eit (1) 
where Ln(Sit) is a vector of the natural logarithm of salaries for i persons during 
time period t; Xit is a matrix of observations on the exogenous variables contained 
in Table 1; B is a coefficient vector; and e is a disturbance term composed of 
all unmeasured causes of salaries. 
Given the availability of longitudinal data, we also estimate the following 
salary growth equation: 
Ln(Si1986/Si1980) ' Xi1980B + ei1980- (2) 
Thus, salary growth is defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of 1986 salary 
divided by 1980 salary. 
Finally, we estimate a similar equation for the number of promotions received 
during the 1980-1986 period: 
PROM Xi1980B + ei1980* (3) 
The salary growth and promotion equations provide a unique opportunity to 
study the attainment of men and women over time. These analyses may help explain 
the process by which men and women reach the differential levels of attainment 
so widely observed in cross-sectional research.11 
Estimates of (1)--(3) were obtained separately for men and women and used 
to decompose salary, salary growth, and promotion differences into two components 
(Blinder, 1973; Jones, 1983): (a) differences in mean levels of endowments, and 
(b) differences in coefficients or prices received for these endowments. Because 
the result of a decomposition varies as a function of which group is used as the 
standard (Cain, 1986), we report decompositions using both the advantaged and 
disadvantaged group as the standard. In addition, we report corresponding "adjusted 
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ratios" (Cain, 1986, p. 746). 
As discussed by Blinder (1973), Oaxaca (1973), Cain (1986), and others, such 
decompositions assume that the variables on the right side of the equation are 
exagenous to gender. If not, additional equations for these rjght side variables 
can, in theory, be added to the model. In the present context, for example, an 
equation for job level might be warranted. As Blinder argued, howPver, this latter 
strategy is often difficult in practice because of identification problems. 
Consistent with this point, we found the determination of job level and salary 
to be so closely intertwined that identification of a two equation model was not 
pos'sible. 
As an alternative, we follow the Blinder and Oaxaca approach of estimating 
a series of equations, introducing variables of more questionable endogeneity in 
steps to the X vector. Thus, in the cross-sectional salary analyses, for example, 
we introduce job level last. This strategy permits an examination of how the 
decomposition results change in response to different model specifications. 
RESULTS 
Table 1 reports means for (a) all employees active in 1986 and (b) employees 
active in both 1980 and 1986. The womenlmen salary ratio is somewhat higher based 
on employees active in both 1980 and 1986. One explanation may be the fact that 
this latter group does not include new entrants to the jobs. New entrants are 
more likely to begin in lower job levels and have less time accumulated at each 
level. Both factors contribute to lower pay relative to higher tenure employees. 
The larger growth of women's employment in the firm's exempt jobs relative to that 
of men suggests that most new entrants were women. 
Table 2 reports mean 1980 and 1986 salaries, and their ratio as a function 
of 1980 job level and gender. These results allow comparisons between men and 
women starting at the same level in 1980 (but not necessarily at the same level 
11 
as of 1986). Overall, the ratio of women's salary to men's salary-is .84 in 1980, 
rising to .88 in 1986, thus eliminating 25% of the salary differential. Consistent 
with this narrowing differential, the mean salary for women increased by a greater 
.- 
pe;centage (61%) between 1980 and 1986 than did the salary of men (54%). 
Within 1980 job levels, similar trends emerge, although the salary 
differentials are much narrower. The ratios of women's mean salaries to those 
of men range from .93 to .95 in 1980. In all cases, these ratios increased between 
1980 and 1986. Again, the decreasing salary differentials are consistent with 
the greater salary growth of women observed at each 1980 job level. A cursory 
examination of the 1980 job levels having sufficient.numbers of both men and women 
(1--3) reveals no obvious relationship between job level and gender differences 
in salary or salary growth. 
One possible concern with the figures in Tables 1 and 2 is that there may 
a selection process related to gender and salary because the longitudinal sample 
includes only employees active in 1986. For example, one scenario is that men 
were observed to receive lower salary increases because men experiencing larger 
salary growth were more likely to leave the firm. Alternatively, discrimination 
against women could have resulted in all but the "cream of the crop" quitting, 
leaving us to observe only the latter group, which received relatively large 
increases. 
Supplementary data, however, suggest that these are not likely problems. 
First, the voluntary quit rate averaged only around 2% per year over the course 
of the study. Second, and more important, we examined salary data on all men and 
women active in 1980 or 1984. The average salary of men and women grew by 35% 
and 40%, respectively during this period. Restricting the sample to only employees 
active in both 1980 a s  1984 yielded growth rates for men and women of 46% and 
53X, respectively. The key point is that the womenhen ratio of growth rates was 
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approximately 1.14 in both cases, suggesting that focusing only on employees active 
in both years docs not influence the observed relative salary growth of men and 
women. Finally, note that the ratio of 1.14 is identical to that found in the 
. - 
f i k t  row, final column of Table 2. 
DECOMPOSITION OF SALARY DIFFERENCES 
As Table 3 indicates, human capital variables alone are able to explain 0- 
32% of the salary advantage of men in the cross-section. Adding job level and . 
performance rating to the model raises the explained percentage to 68-79%. 
suggesting that most of the gap is due to the fact that men tend to hold higher 
level jobs. The corresponding adjusted salary ratios (AM and AW), suggest that 
equalizing human capital would raise the salary ratio to .86-.90. Equalizing job 
level and performance rating as well would raise it to .95-.97.12 
Note that adding performance rating actually results in a slight decrease 
in the explained percentage of the salary differential. Although not shown here, 
this finding was even stronger in analyses of specific job levels. The reasons 
are twofold. First, the mean performance rating of women is slightly higher than 
that of men (2.59 versus 2.52, overall in 1980). Second, although women receive 
a slightly greater return for a given performance rating, its inclusion in the 
model changes some of the other coefficients. l 3  
In summary, the cross-sectional results suggest that men, in general, receive 
greater returns to explanatory variables, consistent with previous cross-sectional 
analyses of male-female salary differentials (Cain, 1986). 
DECOMPOSITION OF SALARY GROhTH DIFFERENCES 
Although women's salary levels fell short of men's, women, as noted earlier, 
experienced greater salary growth in percentage terms. Moreover, as the 
decompositions reported in Table 4 demonstrate, this salary growth advantage cannot 
be entirely explained by the models. The parentheses in Table 4 indicate cases 
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where differences in coefficients favor women. Appendix 2 reports the regression 
results. 
In the overall analyses, 40-49% of women's greater salary growth can be 
. - 
. 
explained by differences in human capital. Adding average performance rating raises 
the explained part to 50-62%. Finally, the inclusion of job level and number of 
promotions raises this figure to 72-74%. Within specific job levels, there is 
a good deal of variance in the extent to which human capital, average performance 
rating and promotions can explain the salary growth advantage of women. 
Table 5 shows the contribution of specific factors to the salary growth 
differential in the node1 containing only human capital variables. An important 
factor accounting for women's advantage is potential experience. Because potential 
experience has a negative impact on salary increases, women benefit from having 
lower levels of- potential experience and having a less negative coefficient.14 
Similarly, with respect to job level, women benefited from having a lower mean 
and a less negative return. The addition of promotion to the model results in 
a sharp reduction of the importance of potential experience and job level in 
accounting for the differential. 
Another important factor is job tenure. Women received larger percentage 
salary increase returns to job tenure.15 Recall that the firm's salary increase 
guide recommends smaller percentage increases as employees progress within the 
salary range at a given level. Because this position in the salary range is not 
likely to be a perfect function of job tenure, the latter may not completely capture 
the effect of current position in range. If men tend to be higher in the salary 
range than women, we would expect men to receive smaller increases than women. 
Women's higher salary growth was also partly a function of their higher average 
perfonnance ratings. Nevertheless, the coefficient on average performance rating 
was smaller for women indicating they received a smaller payoff to performance. 
14  
On the other hand, adding promotion to the model eliminated this disadvantage. 
DECOMPOSITION OF PROMOTION DIFFERENCES 
Table 6 reports the mean number of promotions received by men and women between 
19Q0 and 1986 overall and as a function of 1980 job level-. As in the case of salary 
increases, women had a distinct promotion advantage. Of further interest, this 
advantage like the women's salary growth advantage, does not decline at higher 
job levels. In fact, an examination of these simple descriptive statistics suggests 
the possibility that the advantage may be larger at higher job levels. 
Table 7 presents the results of the decomposition of the promotion differential 
under different model specifications. (Appendix 2 contains the regression results.) 
A key finding is that the conclusion regarding the final model depends on which 
coefficients are used as the standard. When men's coefficients are used as the 
standard, the promotion advantage of women is completely explained by the variables 
in the final model. Table 8 presents results of the decomposition into specific 
factors. In the model containing human capital variables, the main advantage of 
women is again their combination of lower potential experience and a less negative 
promotion return to potential experience. l6 
As with the case of salary growth, the addition of job level and average 
performance rating greatly reduces the role of potential experience. Yet, as Figure 
1 demonstrates, the role of potential experience remains very important. Although 
women receive smaller promotion returns to low levels of potential experience, 
their penalty at higher levels of potential experience is less than that of men. 
This finding is consistent with Lewis (1986). 
Perhaps the most interesting finding, however, is that women receive a much 
smaller promotion payoff to average performance rating. Specifically, an increase 
of 1 point in average performance rating is associated with an additional .45 
promotions for men, .33 promotions for women. 
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EFFECT OF PERCENTAGE FEMALE 
In addition to characteristics of employees, characteristics of jobs such 
as percentage of female incumbents may contribute to pay and promotion differences. 
FOG these analyses, we included persons employed in job title codes having 10 or 
more incumbents. Although job title code information was available for both 1980 
and 1986, the 1986 information was more complete and of better quality than that 
available for 1980. Nevertheless, we were able to develop a sample of 171 wonen 
and 1,697 men present in both 1980 and 1986 in fairly homogeneous job title groups. 
In 1980, 91 job title codes had 10 or more incumbents. Of these 91 codes, 
5 had 50% or more female incumbents. Of the 171 women, 43 (25%) were employed 
in these 5 codes in 1980. Of the 5 predominantly female codes, 2 had no male 
incumbents. These 2 codes (administrative assistant and secretary) employed 17% 
of all women in the sample. Of the remaining 86 job codes, which were predominantly 
male, 35 had no female incumbents. These 35 completely segregated codes employed 
662 (39%) of the total 1,697 men. Examples of some of the larger completely male 
codes were technologist, maintenance supervisor, designer, and senior engineer. 
Models of the type used earlier were estimated separately for men and women. 
Rather than performing a decomposition, however, a measure of the percentage of 
female incumbents in each job title code was added to each equation. As Table 
9 indicates, among women, the impact of percentage female on 1980 salary is not 
statistically significant in any model. In the 1986 salary equation containing 
only human capital variables, the percentage female coefficient is negative and 
not statistically significant. However, the addition of job level (and performance 
rating) results in the coefficient being statistically significant and changes 
the sign such that percentage female has a positive impact on women's salaries 
In the final equation. Specifically, for each increase of 10 percentage .points, 
salary is 0.7% higher. Thus, a change from a completely male to a completely female 
16 
job title code would be associated with a 7% higher 1986 salary. - 
In sharp contrast, men realized a salary penalty in both 1980 and 1986 for 
being in job title codes that had higher percentages of females. In both years, 
. - 
the penalty was much larger without controls for job level. In the final models, 
each increase of 10% female is associated with a .8% decrease in 1980 salary and 
a .5% decrease in 1986 salary. Thus, a change from a completely male to a 
completely female job would be associated with a 8% lower salary in 1980 and a 
5% lower salary in 1986. Parenthetically, we note that the similarity of results 
obtained in the 1980 and 1986 cross-sections may reduce concerns regarding the 
quality of job title code information in 1980. 
Results for the salary growth and promotion equations also appear in Table 
9 .  In the case of women, percentage female appears to have no impact on either 
salary growth or promotions. In contrast, men's salary growth and promotion chances 
increase as percentage female increases. Recall that earlier decompositions 
indicated that women had an advantage over men in terms of promotions and salary 
growth. These results suggest the possibility that part of that advantage may 
be due to the gender composition of the job. It is possible that men receive some 
of the benefit that may be attached to predominantly female jobs. 
DISCUSSION 
We found that the ratio of women/men salaries rose from .84 to .88 over a 
6 year period. Within job levels, salary ratios were higher ( .93  to .95), but 
also increased over the period (.96 to .98 by 1986). Consistent with the narrowing 
differentials, women were found to receive a greater number of promotions and larger 
percentage increases in salary between 1980 and 1986. 
Like numerous other cross-sectional studies, we found that the salary advantage 
of men could not be completely explained by higher levels of endowments, even using 
a relatively complete model that included job level and performance rating. More 
17 
detailed analyses at specific job levels resulted in still less of the salary 
differential being explained, although adjusted salary ratios were similar. 
Nevertheless, using only human capital variables, the adjusted salary ratios 
.- 
(ske Table 3) are among the highest in the literature (see Cain, 1986, Table 6). 
Further, the adjusted salary ratios for the models including job level exceed all 
such ratios summarized by Cain. Our estimates, however, may be somewhat inflated 
because of the (a) exclusion of higher job levels (held mostly by men) and (b) 
the use of salary rather than earnings. 
In contrast to men's cross-sectional salary advantage, we found that women 
received both greater numbers of promotions and larger salary increases over a 
6 year period. Other studies have found similar results with respect to unadjusted 
differences in both promotions (Tsui & Gutek, 1984; Stewart & Gudykunst, 1982; 
Lewis, 1986; Hartmann, 1987) and salary increases (Tsui & Gutek, 1984; Megdal & 
Ransom, 1985). 
Although the promotion advantage could be largely explained by differences 
in mean endowment levels, the same did not hold true for the salary increase 
advantage. Thus, if one chooses to interpret the cross-sectional results as showing 
salary discrimination against women, one may be obliged to interpret the salary 
increase results as suggesting discrimination in favor of women. 
The decomposition results were very sensitive to model specification. Human 
capital variables alone were able to explain anywhere from OX to 32% of men's cross- 
sectional salary advantage. Adding job level and performance rating raised this 
range to 68-79%. Human capital variables were better able to account for 
differences in salary growth (40--49%) and promotions (51-622). Again, however, 
adding job level and (average) performance rating increased this figure 
substantially (58--75% for salary increases; 73--102% for promotions). Of course, 
in the case of promotions and salary increases, the advantage to be explained 
belonged to women. 
Cain (1986) pointed out that the typical effect of including additional 
variables in a salary equation was to increase the adjusted women/men salary ratio. 
. 
Consistent with this general finding, Milkovich (1980), Milkovich and Newman (1987), 
and Hildebrand (1980), among others, have argued that the adjusted.women/men salary 
ratio might be closer to unity if unmeasured differences between men and women 
and relevant labor markets could be better incorporated in salary equations. In 
our study, we were able to move in this direction by including, for example, several 
experience measures, job level, and performance rating in our models. 
Our results, however, indicated that at least in the case of performance 
rating, its inclusion actually led to a slight reduction in the adjusted womenlmen 
salary ratio. In the promotion and salary growth equations, where the unadjusted 
ratios exceeded unity, the inclusion of average performance rating led to sometimes 
sizeable increases in adjusted ratios. Thus, the common thread is that inclusion 
of performance rating does not help explain the raw salary advantage of men, but 
does explain some of the raw advantage of women with respect to salary growth and 
promotions. 
Although women had an overall advantage in the salary increase and promotion 
process, they received a smaller payoff for their performance ratings. For example, 
based on the full promotion equation, men received an average of .45 additional 
promotions for each additional average performance rating point between 1980 and 
1986. In contrast, women received an additional .33 promotions for each additional 
point. This finding is consistent with Olson and Becker's (1983) suggestion that 
women may be held to higher promotion standards than men. 
The fact that women experienced a lower salary disadvantage in the cross- 
section, yet received better salary increases and more promotions over time offers 
an interesting contrast. One implication may be that because men are not favored 
19 
in the salary increase and promotion process, the explanation fort~omen's salary 
level disadvantage must be sought elsewhere. If so, one alternative avenue of 
investigation should perhaps be the recruitment and initial placement of men and 
women. 
Aside from possible differences in initial placement, it may be that women 
have not always been favored in terms of salary increases and promotions. In fact, 
the greater number of promotions and larger salary increases of women may reflect 
an attempt by the firm to reduce what was perceived to be an inequitable salary 
and job level structure. Rosenbaum (1985), for example, found a reduction in the 
negative impact of percent female on salary between 1965 and 1975 in his study. 
Further, he found that the impact of percent female on promotions changed from 
negative to positive over the same period. In the case of the Rosenbaum study, 
the firm had implemented a "serious" affirmative action program during the period 
of the study. 
The firm that we studied had an ongoing affirmative action plan. We also 
noted, for example, that the firm covered EEO issues in its management training. 
Further, although EEO litigation pertaining to these issues among exempt employees 
does not appear to have been important, the firm did settle a case pertaining to 
such practices vis-a-vis hourly employees for a substantial amount. Although no 
formal goals or new practices resulted, one might speculate that this event enhanced 
or at least reinforced the vigilance with which progress toward affirmative action 
and EEO goals was monitored. 
Any progress in the affirmative action area may have been facilitated by the 
general financial success of the company during the period of our study. Research 
by Rosenbaum (1979) suggests that promotion opportunities may be greater during 
periods of organizational (defined as employment) growth. The general financial 
success and growth of the firm we studied may have facilitated affirmative action 
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progress of women employees. It is interesting to note, however,-that the bulk 
of employment growth in exempt jobs seems to have been among women rather than 
men.17 As discussed earlier, this appears to have been partly due to a brief period 
.- 
. 
of reduction in force during the early 1980s. 
The promotion and salary growth advantage of women implies that the salary 
gap would eventually remedy itself if past trends were to continue. Note, however, 
that even a small initial salary disadvantage can take many years to be eliminated. 
As an example, a projection of salary growth rates over the 6 year period into 
the future indicates that the 1980 women/men salary ratio would not equal unity 
until the year 2003. Within job levels 1, 2, and 3, 1980 salaries would equalize 
in 1989, 1996, and 1992, respectively. Of course, as this equalization process 
works to its conclusion, women continue to receive lower salaries. 
In addition to the focus on human capital, job level, and performance ratings, 
our study also examined the possibility that percentage female in a job code was 
a structural factor contributing to attainment differences. Consistent with 
Rosenbaum (1985), controlling job level generally reduced the impact of percentage 
female by a substantial amount. Consistent with Hartmann (1987), percentage female 
had a small positive effect on women's salaries (in 1986). Unlike Hartmann's 
results, however, percentage female had a negative impact on salaries of men. 
With respect to salary growth, the lack of a negative impact of percentage female 
for both men and women was consistent with Hartmann's findings. Regarding 
promotion, although Hartmann found a negative impact of percentage female for women, 
Rosenbaum found a positive impact by the end of his study period. Our results 
suggest no stable impact of percentage female on women's promotion rates. In 
contrast a positive effect was found for men. 
The preceding summary does not really provide support for the idea that 
percentage female is an important structural property that negatively affects 
2 1 
women's (and perhaps men's) attainments. A better research strategy would be to 
examine its impact controlling for other characteristics of jobs or occupations 
that may be related to percentage female. This strategy was demonstrated by Treiman 
. - 
and Hartmann (1981) using national survey data at the occupational level. A 
stronger test, however, would make use of firm level data where similarity of 
occupational titles is more likely to actually correspond to similarity of work 
content. The effect of percentage female in different firms is another possible 
avenue of investigation (Pfeffer 6 Davis-Blake, 1987) in cases where job content 
is standardized. 
Given our study's use of data from a single firm, there is a disadvantage 
relative to the coverage and external validity possible with market-wide or national 
surveys. Along these lines, replication studies would be necessary before 
attempting to answer the question of how typical our results are of other large 
firms' relative treatment of men and women. Nevertheless, the better coverage 
obtained using national survey data comes at the expense of not being able to 
measure productivity in the way that many firms actually measure it. Finally, 
recall that the policies and practices of the firm we studied tended to be 
consistent with those reported in surveys of other large firms. 
Besides the job-specific productivity measures, the results of the present 
study were strengthened by the following. First, the use of longitudinal data 
should have reduced the impact of any unobserved, constant individual differences 
in productivity. Second, firm-specific differences in determinants of salaries 
(e.g. pay policies and practices) are obviously not an issue. Finally, the use 
of data from personnel records rather than self-reports typical of national surveys 
may have reduced the potential for reporting errors (Duncan & Hill, 1985). 
In their agenda for basic research on comparable worth, Hartmann, Roos, and 
Treiman (1985) emphasized that "We need to understand better how wages are set 
2 2 
within enterprises and how they are affected by other employer practices, such 
as job assignment ..." (p. 7). They stressed the importance, especially in large 
firms, of internal labor markets and promotion from within as aspects of job 
.- 
askignment. We hope that our research contributes to a better understanding of 
these processes. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1,Differences that exist between men and women in terms of preferences for 
different types of occupations may also reflect discrimination, whether its 
source is differential socialization in families, schools, and other pre-market 
institutions, or market-based. 
2.This issue of differential attainment due to possible unequal access firms, 
occupations, and/or jobs is sometimes referred to as employment discrimination. 
3.Based on a survey of personnel and industrial relations executives, the 
Bureau of National Affairs (1983) concluded that performance appraisal results 
are used by 86% of firms for making salary increase decisions and by 79% of 
firms for making promotion decisions concerning their white collar workers. 
4,According to Hay Associates, the national actual median increase for 1982 
ranged from 9% for "average performers" to 14.3% for "outstanding performers". 
By 1986, the corresponding figures were approximately 6% and 9%, respectively 
(Hay Compensation Associates, 1986). The corresponding figures for the salary 
guides used in the firm were similar. 
5.Cain (1986) has argued that supervisory ratings of performance are not 
"admissible" because they "might reflect discrimination". However, the 
empirical evidence does not support this hypothesis, despite the fact that a 
large amount of both laboratory and field research has been devoted to this 
question (see Dipboye, 1985 for a review). 
6.See the BRA survey results reported in footnote # 3 on promotion and salary 
increases. The same survey also indicates that rating scales and essays are 
the most commonly used methods of appraisal. Further 97% of firms review 
appraisals at a higher level. 
7.A Bureau of National Affairs (1985) survey found that among firms with over 
1000 employees, over 60% included EEO in their manager training programs. 
Further, EEO was the 4th (of 19) most commonly included issue in such programs. 
8.The firm did not provide data on (a) former employees or on (b) active 
employees in levels 9-15. 
9.The number of promotions is defined using salary increase codes, which 
indicate the reason for an increase !e.g. merit or promotion). The number of 
promotional increases between 1980 and 1986 is used as the definition.It should 
be noted that a promotion can occur without a change in job level. Similarly, 
job level can change in the absence of a promotion. Thus, the correlation 
between changes in job levels and the number of promotions is high but not 
perfect (r = .73). Although some evidence suggests that women receive more 
within-level promotions (Flanders 6 Anderson, 1973; Stewart 6 Gudykunst, 1982), 
this correlation did not differ by gender, suggesting that changes in job level 
and the number of promotions as defined by the firm were related in a similar 
manner for both men and women. Moreover, the women/men ratio of change in job 
levels was virtually identical to women/men ratio of the number of promotions 
(1.33 and 1.38, respectively). Thus, we chose to use the firm's definition of 
a promotion rather than attempt to draw inferences from changes in job level. 
10.Firm tenure is based on the date used for calculating benefits. It is 
important to note that this date can differ from the original hire date. 
Therefore, this measure should give an accurate indication of the amount of 
actual time spent with the firm even for persons not continuously employed with 
the firm. 
1 lsThe inclusion of individual-specif ic intercepts in equations (2)-- (3) could 
be used to eliminate bias due to any lack of independence between X time 
invariant components of e (Mundlak, 1978). Given data at two points in time, 
the use of individual-specific intercepts is equivalent to a fir~t~differencing 
model. There are at least two problems with this model, however. First, 
variables that do not change over time (e.g. firm tenure) must be excluded. 
Second, it exacerbates any unreliability problems. As a result, differences in 
parameter estimates may stem from unreliability rather than elimination of the 
effects of nonindependence of X and e. In the present research, for example, 
performance rating is a key variable. King, Hunter, and Schmidt (1980) have 
estimated the upper bound reliability of supervisory ratings to be 
approximately .60. In the present study, the correlation between performance 
ratings in 1980 and 1986 is approximately .20. Using a formula given by 
Guilford (1954, p. 394), the resulting reliability of the change in performance 
rating would then be approximately .SO. Across adjacent years, the correlation 
between performance ratings is closer to .40, resulting in a difference score 
reliability of .33. By averaging performance ratings and counting promotions 
over time, the reliability problem is reduced. 
12.Within levels, very little of the pay gap could be explained. Because, 
however, the raw ratios were high (see Tables 1 and 2), the adjusted ratios 
were also high. 
13.~0r example, adding performance rating to the equation having human capital 
variables increased the advantage realized by men in returns to job tenure. 
14.The use of potential experience (age - schooling - 6). rather than actual 
experience is problematic for persons with intermittent labor force 
participation. Thus, the role of potential experience in explaining salary 
growth differences in our study may be partly artifactual. As an indirect 
test, we restricted the sample of women to unmarried women only. The resulting 
- 
decomposition (of the full model) actually increased the importance of 
potential experience in explaining women's faster salary growth. 
15.A more flexible functional form (dummy variables for each year of job 
tenure) did not change this conclusion. 
16.We again restricted the sample of women to those who were unmarried. In 
this case, the importance of potential experience was diminshed somewhat, but 
remained important. 
17.This is not to say that there were not also a substantial number of newly 
entering men as well. The net growth of women seems to have been higher 
because there were fewer women in exempt jobs at retirement age, for example. 
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TABLE 1 1986 S a l a r i e s  of Men and Women, by 1986 Job Level  
1986 Cross -sec t iona l  Sample 1986 Longi tud ina l  Sample 
. Women Men W/M Women -- Men W/M 
Job N Mean N Mean Job N Mean N Mean 
Level  S a l a r y  Sa l a ry  Level  S a l a r y  Sa l a ry  
ALL 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
.84 ALL 840 40,004 
-92 1 114 31,092 
.93 2 156 34,675 
.96 3 174 37,697 
.95 4 98 41,589 
.95 5 182 44,274 
.95 6 109 51,067 
.94 7 17 55,805 
.TABLE 2 1980 and 1986 Salaries  of Men and Women, by 1980 Job Level 
1980 Job Level Women Men Women /Men 
A l l  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
aWomen [salary 1986lsalary 1980) - 1 
Men [salary 1986/salary 19801 - 1 
TABLE 3 Decomposition of Salary Differences 
Decomposition Standard 
Variables in R~ Men Women Differential 
€qua t ion . - 
Women Men Coeff Endow Coeff Endow Raw AM AW 
HC 
HC, PA80 
HC, Level 
HC, Level, PA80 
N of observations 
HC 
HC, PA86 
HC, Level 
HC, Level, PA86 
N of observations 
HC 
HC, PA86 
RC, Level 
HC, Level, PA86 
N of obsevations 
1980 Longitudinal Sample 
.19 -29 -73 -27 .86 
.21 -33 .76 -24 -88 
.58 .71 .28 .72 .31 
.62 .73 .31 .69 -32 
1986 Longitudinal Sample 
.29 .21 .80 -20 1.00 
.32 .28 .82 .18 1.01 
.79 .80 .2 1 -79 .29 
.82 .83 -23 .77 .30 
1986 Cross-sectional Sample 
.30 .31 .68 -32 .73 
.33 .37 .70 .30 . 75 
.81 -83 .25 .75 .22 
-83 .85 .27 .73 -24 
3 2 
TABLE 4 Decomposition of Salary Growth Differences, by 1980 Job Level 
Variables in Decomposition Standard 
Equation 
R~ Men Women Differential 
Women Men Coeff Endow Coeff Endow Raw. Aw AM 
HC , AVGPA .23 .30 
HC, LEVEL .15 .2 1 
RC, LEVEL, AVGPA -24 .31 
HC, LEVEL, AVGPA, .39 .43 
PROM 
HC .16 -29 
HC, AVGPA .23 .43 
HC, AVGPA, PROM .35 .57 
HC .26 .30 
HC, AVGPA .37 -34 
HC, AVGPA, PROM .56 .45 
HC .14 .18 
HC, AVGPA . 3  1 -31 
HC, AVGPA, PROM -53  044 
All Levels 
( .5 l )a  .49 (.60) 
(.38) .62 (.SO) 
(.46) .54 (.S3) 
(.25) -75 (.42) 
(.26) .74 (.28) 
Level 1 
-.I4 (1.02) 
.49 (.go) 
.33 ( -77)  
Level 2 
.so (1.10) 
1.13 (.46) 
1.28 (.lo) 
Level 3 
.68 (.52) 
.TO (.58) 
.86 (.41) 
Note: Number of observations is 840 for women, 5550 for men 
aparentheses indicate that coefficients favor women. 
TABLE 5 Decomposition of Salary Growth Difference between Men and Women 
WOMEN MEN WOMEN MEN 
Total X E X C X E X C Total X E X C X E % C Total X E X C X E X C 
Variable 
INTERCEPT -208 -208 -208 -147 -147 -147 -192 -192 -192 
EIIUCATION 6 4 3 5 0 -2 1 -1 3 -3 -2 0 2 2 -4 
TENURE -62 15 -76 6 -68 -70 18 -88 6 -76 -30 15 -45 7 -38 
JOB TENURE 121 7 113 3 113 120 0 120 8 112 179 -11 190 -3 182 
NONWHITE -4 -2 -3 -1 -4 -3 -1 -2 O -3 -1 -I O 0 0 
EXP 247 16 232 30 217 18 1 14 167 13 158 85 8 76 13 71 
3 1 10 20 18 13 JOB LEVEL -9 -1 -8 -4 -5 
AVGPA -12 16 -29 17 -29 13 13 0 13 0 
PROM 59 49 10 46 13 
TOTAL 100 40 60 45 55 100 58 42 75 25 100 ?2 28 74 26 
aGroup used a8 decomposition standard 
TABLE 6 Mean Promotions for Men and Women, 1980-1986 
1980 Job Level Women Men Women /Men 
. - 
N Mean N Mean 
All 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
3 5 
TABLE 7 Decomposition of Promotion Differences, 1980-1986 
Variables in Decomposition Standard 
Equation . - 
. 
~2 Men Women Differential 
Women Men Coeff Endow Coeff Endow Raw AW AM 
BC, AVGPA 
HC, LEVEL 
HC, AVGPA, 
LEVEL 
HC 
HC, AVGPA 
HC 
HC, AVGPA 
HC 
HC, AVGPA 
All Levels 
-26 -27 (.38)a .62 
.28 .30 (-32) .68 
.26 .30 (.09) .91 
-28  -34 -.02 1.02 
Level 1 
.27 -32 (-34) -66 
.27 -38 -1.15 2.15 
Level 2 
.40 .32 (.47) .53 
.43 .35 (.21) .79 
Level 3 
-27 .25 (.29) .71 
-33 .30 (.28) -72 
Note: Number of observations is 840 for women, 5550 for men 
aparentheses indicate that coefficients favor women. 
TABLE 8 Decomposition of Promotion Difference between Men and Women 
WOMENa MEN WOMEN MEN 
.- 
. 
Total X E X C X E X C Total X E X C X E X C 
INTERCEPT 
EDUCATION 
TENURE 
JOB TENURE 
NONWHITE 
EXP 
JOB LEVEL 
AVGPA 
TOTAL 
aGroup used as decomposition standard 
TABLE 9 Regression Coefficient for Percentage Female 
MEN 
-
1980 SALARY 
HC, Level .0049 
HC, Level, .0023 
PA80 
1986 SALARY 
HC, Level .0123** 
HC, Level, .OO72** 
PA86 
198611980 SALARY 
HC ,0058 
HC, Level .0039 
HC, Level, -. 0025 
AVGPA 
HC, Level -.0017 
AVGPA, PROM 
PROMOTION 
HC, Level ,0008 
HC, Level, 9.0134 
AVGPA 
Note: Number of observations is 171 for women, 1697 for men. Percentage 
female is measured in units of 10% 
*p c.05 
**p <.01 
APPENDIX 1 Summary and Means of Independent Variables 
. 1980 ' 1986 1986 
. - 
Women Men Women Men Women Men 
Human Capital (HC) 
Highest Degree 
High School (or missing) 
Associate 
Bachelor of Arts 
Bachelor of Science 
Master of Science 
Master of Arts 
Master of Business Adm. 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Experience - 
_ -  
Potential Experiencea 16.306 18.656 22.306 24.656 18.630 21.552 
Potential ~x~erience2 364.875 435.740 596.546 695.606 454.968 572.402 
Firm Tenure 9.040 11.376 15.040 17.376 10.839 14.043 
Firm ~ e n u r e ~  126.955 186,459 271.435 358.972 170.645 273.685 
Job Tenure 3.008 3.812 5.336 6.218 3.852 5.096 
Job ~ e n u r e ~  11.765 18.352 37.382 51.181 20.634 36.138 
Race (nonwhiteml) -075 .050 .Of 5 .050 .027 .02 1 
Gender (maleml) --- --- --- - -- --- --- 
Job Level 2.206 3.434 3.515 4.421 2.641 3.694 
Performance Rating 2.593 2.519 2.620 2.566 2.607 2.548 
Average Performance Rating, 
1980-1986 (AVGPA) 
N of observations 840 5550 840 5550 2412 9647 
aAge - years of schooling - 6 
APPENDIX 2 Salary Growth and Promotion Regressions 
Salary Growth Ptomo t ion 
Variable Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Men Women Women 
INTERCEPT 
ASSOC 
R A 
R S 
MS 
MA 
HBA 
PHD 
TENURE (00) 
TENURE SQ (00) 
JOR TENURE 
JOB TENURE SQ 
NONWHITE 
EXP (00) 
EXP SQ (00) 
JOB LEVEL 
AVGPA 
PROM 
aThe (00) indicates that the coefficient was multiplied by 100 
PROMOTION AND POTENTIAL EXPERIENCE, 
BY GENDER 
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POlENTM EXPERIENCE 
